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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BENNETT ASSOCIATION 
-vs.-
UTAH STATE TAX 
( '01\BIISSION, 
' Pla,intiff, 
Defendant. 
Case 
No. 10682 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO AUTHORITY IN THE STAT-
UTE OR THE REGULATIONS FOR DEFEND-
ANT'S POSITION THAT AN AFFILIATED 
CORPORATION SHOULD HAVE A "TAX-
ABLE YEAR'' OF ITS OWN BEFORE IT IS 
ENTITLED TO JOIN IN A CONSOLIDATED 
RETURN FOR SUCH YEAR. 
Point I of defendant's argument completely over-
looks the fundamental proposition that a consolidated 
"group" is the taxpaying entity - not its constituent 
members. This was the intent of the statute and regu-
lations when a new approach for taxing a group of cor-
porations was adopted by defendant overthirty-five years 
l 
ago. The only "taxable year" involved with a group is 
the group's taxable year. Defendant's brief cites abso-
lutely no authority for a conclusion to the contrary. 
Section 59-13-23, UCA 1953, refers to "corporatio118 
which have been members of the affiliated group at any 
time during the taxable year." The words "the taxable 
year" clearly refer to the group's taxable year and not 
to the taxable years of constituent members. (Emphasis 
added) 
POINT II 
IN THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE ITSELF, 
UPON THE MAKING OF A CONSOLIDATED 
RETURN INCLUSION OF A MEMBER'S IN-
COME IN THE GROUP'S RETURN IS MAN-
DATORY, NOT PERMISSIVE. 
Defendant states at page 7 of its brief that "at the 
time of the filing of the parent's return in this case, the 
election was not made to have Bennett's income includ-
ed in the return ... '' Plaintiff sees no permissive language 
in either the statute or the regulations, and defendant 
cites none that gives such an election. To the contrary, 
the inclusion of Bennett's income for the period during 
which it was a member of the consolidated group is by 
statute and regulation mandatory. The proffered amend-
ed return was an attempt to fully and fairly report all 
income of the consolidated group. 
Defendant has held in its Decision opinion at para-
graph 2 that Bennett's was a "member" of the affiliated 
group at the time the liquidating distribution was made. 
2 
'I1he statute, 59-13-23 UCA 1953, states that the making 
of a consolidated return shall be considered as consent 
to the regulations. The regulations, Article 32 of Reg. 4, 
state that if a corporation ceases to be a member of an 
affiliated group which makes a consolidated return " ' ... 
the income of such corporation to be included in the con-
Holidated return shall be computed on the basis of its 
income ... for the period during which it is a member 
of the group." (Emphasis added) It is submitted that 
the terms ''shall be considered,'' ''to be included,'' and 
''shall be computed,'' are mandatory rather than permis-
siYe and no choice existed once the parent filed a con-
solidated return. 
Defendant argues that a consolidated return was not 
made. This is clearly in error since by Article 15 of Reg. 
4 the parent corporation is the agent of each corporation 
which during any part of the taxable year was a member 
of the affiliated group for all purposes in respect of the 
tax for such year. The Article goes on to say that "the 
proYisions of the paragraph shall apply whether or not 
one or more members have become or have ceased to be 
members of the group at any time.'' Thus, in making the 
consolidated return, plaintiff was duly authorized, indeed 
required, to act for Bennett's. 
POINT III 
SINCE BENNETT'S WAS A MEMBER OF 
THE AFFILIATED GROUP, ITS INCOME 
PRIOR TO DISSOLUTION MUST BE IN-
CLUDED IN THE GROUP'S CONSOLIDATED 
RETURN. 
3 
Defc.rnlcrnt, 011 pag(' 8 in Poiui II, ass('rb; that "af-
filiatNl group" is cl('fi11e<l by the regulation as not in-
c 1ucli11g corporations not subject to the tax under the Art , 
and that Bennett's ,,·as not subject to tax under the Act 
for the >-ear 1964- because it owed no tax on the activities 
in the year it dissoh'ecl. Curionsl>·, defendant is arguing, 
and so states, that Bennett's was not a member of an 
affiliated group, and it has pre,·iosly conceded otherwise 
in its decision. Defernlant simpl~- owrlooks the fnrt tlH1t 
sine(' the group, and not the constituent memlwrs, is thC' 
taxpaying en tit>-, the acti,-ities of Bemwtt 's dnring the 
period .January 1st to -:\farch 31st, Hl64, were artiYities 
of the group, and are full>- snhject to franchise tax to 
the group in the year 1965 for the group's preceding tax-
able year 1964. 
It is submitt('d that the phras(' "not snhject to tax" 
refers to charitable corporations and the like. If this is 
not true, Article 2 (b) of Regulation 4 r('nders Article 34 
of Regulation 4 mea11ingless. 
POIKT IY 
THE STATU1'I<~S AND REGULATIONS ARE 
MEANI:t\GFUL, CONSISTENT AND EQUI-
TABLE. 
If defendant is correct that a corporaiton liquidating 
into its parent is, in the >-ear of its clissol11tion, not eligible 
to join in a consolidated return, then wlwn ean Article ;)4 
ever lun-e anY meaning? 
Defernhrnt seems to imp]>-, h~- the manner in \\·l1ieh it 
i talicizcs a pa rt of Ser. ;}9-13-23 ( 2), lT CA 1 !153, on page 0, 
4 
• 
that what plaintiff did involved an avoidance of tax lia-
liility. Defendant overlooks the fact that Article 34 also 
prevents a parent from deducting losses if they occur 
upon a liquidating distribution from a ninety-five percent 
mn1cd subsidiary in an intercompany transaction. 
As plaintiff pointed out in its opening brief (page 
14), the United States Supreme Court inllfeld v. H erma;n-
111·z upheld the validity of Article 37(a) of Regulation 75, 
which our Article 34(a) of Regulation 4 adopted. The 
Uuited States Supreme Court held that the parent could 
not deduct the losses of subsidiaries which were dissolved 
and liquidated into the parent, and thus the Court 
reaC'hed precisely the same conclusion which plaintiff 
nrges this Court to reach. 
The regulatory plan as authorized by statute recog-
nizes a difference between a single corporation and a 
group of corporations when the requisite ninety-five per-
cent control over subsidiaries exists. Not only are the 
income and expenses of all membel's aggregated under 
the group-as-an-entity approach, but upon the liquidation 
of one of the subsidiaries this same approach recognizes 
that the assets are not distributed to the parent's share-
holders, but remain in the group. These assets are still 
locked in a continuing business corporation and a tax, 
measured by the operating income produced by these 
assets, is properly assessed and paid. This makes good 
sense when it is realized that the position of the share-
holders owning stock in the parent is not changed either 
in substance or form. The parent's shareholders still 
have a corporate entity intervening between them and 
5 
the business assets. Ultimately, \Yhe11 the parent (plain-
tiff in this case) rlissolves and liquidates, the correct gain 
or loss to the parent's shareholders can be cletreminecl, 
and it will be recognized. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the decision of the clefenchrnt 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGUM 
By F. s. PRINCE 
and JORN K. MANGUM 
315 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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